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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”) 
applied for enforcement of an NLRB decision and order finding 
that ImageFIRST Uniform Rental Service, Inc. (“ImageFirst”) 
violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  
ImageFirst cross-petitioned for review of the NLRB’s decision 
and order.  We will grant in part and deny in part both the 
application for enforcement and the cross-petition for review.   
We will grant the application for enforcement and will 
deny the cross-petition for review as to the uncontested portions 
of the decision and order—specifically the NLRB’s findings that 
ImageFirst violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by prohibiting 
union representatives from distributing pro-union literature in 
the public right-of-way adjacent to ImageFirst’s facility and by 
attempting to remove the union representatives from the public 
right-of-way.     
The NLRB also found that ImageFirst violated Section 
8(a)(1) by threatening to summon and summoning the police 
when the union representatives refused to leave from the public 
right-of-way.  We will grant ImageFirst’s cross-petition for 
review and will deny the NLRB’s application for enforcement as 
to this finding.  Substantial evidence did not support the 
NLRB’s finding that ImageFirst’s threat to call the police and 
the company’s call to the police were motivated solely by a 
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desire to remove the union representatives from the right-of-
way.  Given the evidence in the record as well as the findings of 
facts made by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), no 
reasonable finder of fact could have failed to find that 
ImageFirst’s conduct was motivated by a broader—and 
reasonable—concern over its property interests based on the 
union representatives’ repeated and ongoing forays onto its 
private property.   
I. 
 ImageFirst provides health care laundry services at a non-
union facility located on Prospect Road in Columbia, 
Pennsylvania.  The Philadelphia Joint Board, Workers United 
a/w Service Employees International Union filed a charge of 
unfair labor practices against the company.  The charge arose 
out of the company’s alleged efforts, undertaken by Bryan 
Cunningham (the general manager of the Columbia facility), to 
prevent four union representatives (Jennifer Valentin, who was 
the leader of the group, Gladys Toledo, Silvia Patterson, and 
Tina Gainer) from distributing pro-union leaflets outside the 
facility on the morning of December 16, 2015.  Section 7 of the 
NLRA guarantees employees “the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. § 157.  
Section 8(a)(1) provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exercise of” their Section 7 rights.  29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(1).  After an initial investigation, the NLRB General 
Counsel filed a complaint of unfair labor practices against 
ImageFirst.  The ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing and 
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subsequently issued a decision and a proposed order.       
 The ALJ considered whether ImageFirst violated Section 
8(a)(1) by demanding that the union representatives leave a 
public right-of-way and threatening to summon and then 
summoning the police while they were distributing handbills to 
its employees.  The public right-of-way includes the shoulder 
running parallel to Prospect Road.  ImageFirst’s property is 
separated from the shoulder by a concrete curb.  The curb 
borders a strip of grass, which itself borders a small parking lot, 
all of which is owned by ImageFirst.  In addition, ImageFirst’s 
property encompasses the driveway connecting the parking lot 
with Prospect Road.  ImageFirst has a fee title to the centerline 
of Prospect Road, subject to an easement of public use.  
According to the ALJ, ImageFirst failed to meet its burden 
under Indio Grocery Outlet, 323 NLRB 1138, 1141 (1997), 
enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 
1999), to show that, when Cunningham demanded that the 
police remove the union representatives distributing union 
literature on the public right-of-way, the company possessed a 
property interest in the shoulder of the road allowing it to 
exclude the union representatives.    
The ALJ characterized the issue before him as “whether 
the union representatives were engaged in union leafleting on 
the Respondent’s property and not on the shoulder of the 
Prospect Road and whether the Respondent was concerned over 
public safety.”  (JA11.)  “Counsel for the Respondent argued 
that Cunningham had only wanted the four union representatives 
removed from the facility’s property.  While the Respondent’s 
property included the public right-of-way, the Respondent 
concedes that it had no problem with the public or the 
representatives standing and walking on the shoulder.”  (Id.)  
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The ALJ, however, found that this was not the company’s 
position on the morning of December 16: 
I do not credit Cunningham’s testimony that he 
merely wanted the four union representatives 
removed from the company’s property. 
In my opinion, I believe that the 
Respondent wanted the union representatives 
removed from the Respondent’s property that it 
mistakenly believed included the shoulder of 
Prospect Road and that it could exercise control 
over the shoulder of the road based upon its 
ownership of a fee to the center of the road. 
 I find that Cunningham was operating 
under a mistaken belief that the Respondent 
control of its property extended to the middle of 
the road without regards to the public right-of-
way or easement. . . . .  
(JA11.)   
The ALJ made this finding based on several 
considerations.  The ALJ explained that the union 
representatives, even if they had initially been standing on the 
grassy area, moved to the shoulder minutes after Cunningham 
spoke with them and asked them to move.  When he spoke with 
them the second time (after consulting with his superiors), they 
thereby had already moved to the shoulder.  Cunningham asked 
them to leave, and Valentin (the union field coordinator) said 
that they had a right to be there.  Cunningham then had no 
authority to ask them to leave or to threaten to call the police 
because they did exactly what they were told to do.  “There was 
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no reason for Cunningham to call the police because the four 
representatives were now on the shoulder and not on the 
Respondent’s property.  It is obvious to me that Cunningham 
was under a mistaken belief that the Respondent could continue 
to demand that the union representatives to [sic] leave a public 
right-of-way.”  (Id.)  Acting based on this mistaken belief, 
Cunningham called the police, told them that the union 
representatives were trespassing, and demanded that they be 
arrested.  Cunningham acquiesced only after the police told him 
that the shoulder was a public right-of-way and that the union 
representatives were allowed to stay while they were on the 
shoulder: 
Here, testimony regarding the location and 
consequences of the activities of the handbillers 
was provided by the General Counsel’s witnesses 
and Cunningham.  Although Cunningham told 
them to leave Respondent’s property, both 
Valentin and Grainer testified, without 
contradiction, that they were situated on the 
public right-of-way after their initial conversation 
with Cunningham.  Cunningham admitted upon 
exiting his car on the second occasion that the 
union representatives were on the shoulder.  He 
also conceded and did not protest once the police 
told him that the union representatives could stay 
on the shoulder, which the police corrected him 
that it was a public right-of-way. 
(Id.)   
           In the heading to the next section of his decision, the ALJ 
stated that “The Trespassing was Insignificant to Warrant the 
 
 8 
Removal of the Union Representatives.”  (Id.)    
Responding (again) to ImageFirst’s assertion that 
Cunningham wanted the union representatives to leave its 
property, the ALJ found that, although upset that they were 
initially standing on the grassy area of the property, 
Cunningham did not truly believe that the alleged trespassing 
was so egregious to warrant police removal (a finding supported 
by the fact that he never demanded that the union 
representatives be removed or arrested for any alleged 
trespassing that may have occurred before the arrival of the 
police).  “On this point, I fully credit the testimony of Officers 
Stutzman and Villano,” because they were neutral observers 
who testified in a candid and open manner consistent with the 
corroborated record.  (JA12 n.15.)  Officer Stutzman testified 
that it would not be trespassing if an owner told the union 
representatives to get off the property and they did so.  “This is 
exactly what had occurred here.  According to Cunningham, 
above, he observed the union representatives on the grassy area 
and in the driveway, told them to get off his property and by the 
time he finished the calls to [his supervisors] Brown and 
Geraghty, they had already moved to the shoulder.”  (Id.)  
Officer Villano testified that Cunningham “never demanded 
they were on the property and refused to leave.”  (Id.)  “‘If we 
would arrive and Mr. Cunningham would have said they were 
on the property and refused to leave when told to do so, that 
would have been a trespass and they would have been arrested 
for trespassing.”  (Id. (quoting JA423).)  According to Officer 
Villano, Cunningham “didn’t say that” to him.  (Id. (quoting 
JA423).)   
However, the ALJ then explained in some detail that the 
union representatives’ forays—including their incursions onto 
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ImageFirst’s driveway—did not rise to the level of trespassing 
and that, even if they did, would not justify calling the police: 
Officer Stutzman also recalled one leafletting 
occasion during his presence with a representative 
walking to the car.  Officers Stutzman and Villano 
took no action even though the representative 
would more likely than not had entered into the 
Respondent’s driveway while under his 
observation ([JA437, JA438]).  Cunningham also 
took no action to point the trespassing to the 
officers. 
 My point is that a brief foray on the grassy 
area to talk to Cunningham (which I cannot 
conceive this to be trespassing, as argued by the 
Respondent, since there is an implicit 
understanding that one would approach another at 
mid-point to talk and Cunningham did not venture 
onto the grassy area) or to hand out a leaflet in the 
driveway would not reasonably be considered 
trespassing.  Such handful of very brief and 
isolated forays on the lip of the driveway is 
insignificant to warrant a finding that the union 
representatives were trespassing.  I would also 
take note that the Respondent did not 
subsequently contact the police after December 
16 on alleged trespassing by union representatives 
and members even though it was aware of the 
trespassing ([JA578-JA582]). 
 Assuming such minor infractions on 
December 16 are considered as trespassing, I also 
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find the trespassing as infrequent, insignificant, 
not substantial and merely harmless error in that 
the union representatives did not venture far from 
the shoulder, the incursions were infrequent, the 
union representatives were very brief in 
approaching a driver and quick to return to the 
shoulder, and their presence did not cause any 
safety or other hazardous condition of public 
concern.  Officer Villano testified that it would 
not be trespassing if the union representatives 
were briefly standing on the concrete curb to 
avoid traffic ([JA421]).  I find such infractions no 
different as when a pedestrian or cyclist would 
stop and rest on the curb or grassy area of the 
Respondent’s property.   
 To the extent that Valentin and Gainer 
crossed the line onto private property, which I 
have found to be infrequent and quick forays, the 
credited testimony establishes that such incursions 
were minimal and were not disruptive to 
operations and therefore not sufficient to 
constitute a trespass which would justify 
summoning the police or with the police taking 
any action to arrest the representatives.  See, e.g., 
[New Jersey Bell, 308 NLRB 277 (1992)], above 
(causing the arrest and filing of a criminal 
complaint against a union agent who remained on 
employer’s premises 3 to 4 minutes after being 
told to leave found to violate the Act). 
 Accordingly, I find that the Respondent 
attempted to remove the union representatives 
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engaged in union handbilling in violation of the 
Act and not because they were trespassing on the 
Respondent’s property. 
(JA12-JA13 (also noting that Deanna Robinson’s testimony 
indicating that she was approached by union representative in 
parking lot was consistent with Valentin’s admission that 
Patterson entered into parking area but that this approach was 
not known to Cunningham and thereby could not have been 
basis for summoning police).) 
 Furthermore, the ALJ found, on the one hand, that 
ImageFirst’s actions were not motivated by safety concerns.  On 
the other hand, the ALJ determined that ImageFirst did not 
instruct a van driver transporting several employees to drive past 
the union representatives and that the company did not engage 
in surveillance of employees receiving handbills from the union 
representatives.   
 Based on these factual findings and discussion of the 
relevant legal principles and case law, the ALJ made, inter alia, 
the following conclusions of law: 
3.  The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the 
Act on about December 16, 2016, by prohibiting 
union representatives from distributing prounion 
literature in the public right-of-way adjacent to 
the Respondent’s facility. 
4.  The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the 
Act on about December 16, 2015, by attempting 
to remove the union representatives from the 
public right-of-way. 
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5.  The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the 
Act on about December 16, 2015, by threatening 
and summoning the police when the union 
representatives refused to leave from the public 
right-of-way. 
6.  The Respondent did not otherwise violate 
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by allegedly engaging 
in surveillance of employees receiving the union 
literature from the union representatives about on 
December 16, 2015. 
7.  The Respondent did not otherwise violate 
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Cunningham 
allegedly instructed the van driver to drive past 
the union representatives preventing employees 
from receiving union handbills. 
(JA16.)  The ALJ recommended that ImageFirst be ordered to 
post a remedial notice and be ordered to cease and desist from 
prohibiting union representatives from distributing union 
literature to employees in the public right-of-way, attempting to 
remove them from the public-right-of-way, or, in any like or 
similar manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing 
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.   
 A three-member panel of the NLRB, with Chairman 
Miscimarra concurring, affirmed the ALJ’s rulings, findings 
(including the ALJ’s credibility determinations), and 
conclusions.  The majority adopted the recommended order as 
modified.  “There were no exceptions to the judge’s dismissal of 
the allegations that the Respondent violated 8(a)(1) by 
instructing a van to drive past the union representatives, thereby 
preventing employees in the van from receiving the handbill, or 
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by surveilling employees as they received the union handbill.”  
(JA1 n.1.)  According to the NLRB majority, ImageFirst was not 
motivated by a reasonable concern to protect its own property 
interest: 
In adopting the judge’s finding that the 
Respondent violated the Act by threatening to 
summon and summoning the police, we find that 
the Respondent’s conduct was not motivated by a 
reasonable concern over protecting its property 
interest.  See Nations Rent, Inc., 342 NLRB 179, 
181 (2004).  Before the Respondent called the 
police, the union representatives had already 
moved to the shoulder of the highway at the 
Respondent’s request; the union representatives 
were on the shoulder, not the Respondent’s 
private property, when the police arrived; and it 
was not reasonable for the Respondent to believe 
it had a property interest in the shoulder that 
privileged it to exclude the union representatives 
from the shoulder, in light of the open and 
notorious public use of the shoulder by, for 
example, pedestrians, cyclists, and people picking 
up their mail, of which the Respondent was well 
aware.  See Food for Less, 318 NLRB 646, 650 
fn.6 (1995) (“[E]ven assuming the [r]espondent 
properly controlled the sidewalk, it caused the 
union representatives to be ejected not only from 
the sidewalk but from [other areas]—clearly 
beyond any authority pursuant to a property 
interest held by the [r]espondent.”), enfd. in rel. 
part 95 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 1996).  Accordingly, 
we find that the Respondent violated the Act 
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when it threatened to call and called the police on 
the basis that it sought to have the union 
representatives removed or arrested because they 
were engaged in protected union handbilling on 
the public shoulder of the highway adjacent to the 
Respondent’s private property. 
(JA1 n.1.)  The majority stated that this finding was not based 
on the ALJ’s own finding of de minimis trespassing.  “We do 
not rely on the judge’s finding that the union representatives’ 
entry onto the Respondent’s private property—by briefly 
standing on a grassy area and the Respondent’s driveway—was 
a de minimis trespass.  Accordingly, we do not address our 
colleague’s discussion of that finding.”  (Id.)   
That colleague, Chairman Miscimarra, explained in his 
concurring opinion that, while the union representatives at times 
stepped onto the grassy area between the shoulder of the road 
and the parking lot to avoid passing traffic, they confined 
themselves to the shoulder after they were told to stay off 
ImageFirst’s property.  “If an automobile stopped at the bottom 
of the driveway, a representative would take a few steps into the 
driveway to deliver the leaflet.”  (JA2.)  Citing Nations Rent and 
Food for Less, Chairman Miscimarra joined the majority in 
finding that ImageFirst violated the NLRA both by demanding 
that the union representatives stop leafleting from the shoulder 
and by threatening to call and then calling the police when they 
refused.  Chairman Miscimarra disagreed with the ALJ’s finding 
that the representatives did not trespass when they entered the 
driveway to distribute handbills or that, if they did trespass, it 
was de minimis and excusable.  (See JA2 n.1 (further 
summarizing ALJ’s trespassing findings).)  “This finding is 
unnecessary to the disposition of this case, and my colleagues do 
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not rely on it.  I believe that the Board should repudiate this 
analysis because it is directly contrary to Supreme Court 
precedent.”  (JA2.)  Relying on Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 
U.S. 527 (1992), Chairman Miscimarra then explained why the 
union representatives had no Section 7 right to trespass on 
ImageFirst’s property, regardless of the scope or extent of their 
trespass. 
II. 
 The NLRB possessed jurisdiction over this proceeding 
under Section 10(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 10(e) and (f), 29 U.S.C. § 
160(e), (f).   
 This Court applies a plenary standard over questions of 
law and the NLRB’s application of legal precepts (although we 
also defer to its reasonable interpretations of the NLRA).  See, 
e.g., Trimm Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 351 F.3d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Factual findings by the NLRB are reviewed under the 
substantial evidence standard.  See, e.g., § 160(e), (f); Adv. 
Disposal Servs. East, Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 592, 606 (3d Cir. 
2016).  Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla, and it 
means relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.  See, e.g., id.  While 
deferential, this standard requires us to consider both the 
evidence in the record supporting the NLRB’s findings of fact as 
well as “whatever in the record fairly detracts” from its findings. 
 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).   
III. 
ImageFirst does not challenge the summary enforcement 
of certain aspects of the NLRB’s decision and order.  
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“ImageFirst is not disputing the NLRB’s limited finding that 
Cunningham’s erroneous belief that the Company had a 
property interest in the shoulder of the road was unreasonable, 
and thus, a violation of the Act.”  (ImageFirst’s Brief at 1 n.1.)  
“The Company is not seeking review of the Board’s conclusion 
that it violated the Act by seeking to have the Union 
representatives removed from the shoulder of Prospect Road.”  
(Id. at 9 n.4; see also id. at 19 n.10 (“Here, [ImageFirst] 
concedes that Cunningham’s attempt to have the Union 
representatives excluded from the shoulder of Prospect Road 
was improper.”).)  We will grant the application for enforcement 
filed by the NLRB and will deny the cross-petition for review 
filed by ImageFirst as to the NLRB’s findings that ImageFirst 
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by prohibiting union 
representatives from distributing pro-union literature in the 
public right-of-way adjacent to ImageFirst’s facility and by 
attempting to remove the union representatives from the public 
right-of-way. 
However, ImageFirst does argue that the NLRB failed to 
consider undisputed facts found by the ALJ in its determination 
that Cunningham’s call to the police was not motivated by a 
reasonable concern for the company’s property rights.  We 
agree.  In short, substantial evidence did not support the finding 
by the NLRB that ImageFirst’s threat to call the police and the 
company’s call to the police were motivated solely by a desire to 
remove the union representatives from the public right-of-way.  
Given the evidence in the record as well as the ALJ’s findings of 
fact, no reasonable finder of fact could have failed to find that 
ImageFirst’s conduct was motivated by a broader concern over 
its property interests, implicated by the union representatives’ 
repeated and ongoing forays onto its private property.  A 
reasonable fact-finder would also have to find that the 
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company’s concern was reasonable.  We will therefore grant 
ImageFirst’s cross-petition for review and deny the NLRB’s 
application for enforcement as to the finding by the NLRB that 
ImageFirst violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by threatening 
to summon and summoning the police when the union 
representatives refused to leave from the public right-of-way. 
 Generally, “an employer cannot be compelled to allow 
distribution of union literature by nonemployee organizers on 
his property.”  Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 
(1992).  “Where the ‘location of a plant and the living quarters 
of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of 
reasonable union efforts to communicate with them,’ [NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956)], employers’ 
property rights may be ‘required to yield to the extent needed to 
permit communication of information on the right to organize,’ 
[Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112].”  Id. at 533-34.  It is uncontested 
that no such exception could apply in this proceeding.  It is also 
uncontested that an employer cannot restrict union access to 
public property or private property from which the employer 
does not possess the right to exclude others.  See, e.g., Indio 
Grocery Outlet, 323 NLRB 1138, 1141 (1997) (“The Board has 
stated that ‘in cases in which the exercise of Section 7 rights by 
nonemployee union representatives is assertedly in conflict with 
a respondent’s private property rights, there is a threshold 
burden on the respondent to establish that it had, at the time it 
expelled the union representatives, an interest which entitled it 
to exclude individuals from the property [emphasis in 
original].’” (quoting Food for Less, 318 NLRB at 646, 649 
(1995), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. O’Neil’s Markets v. 
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Meatcutters Local 
88, 95 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 1996)), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. 
Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999).   
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It is well established that there is no NLRA violation 
where an employer can show that its threat to call or its call to 
the police “is motivated by some reasonable concern, such as 
public safety or interference with legally protected interests.”  
Nations Rent, Inc., 342 NLRB 179, 181 (2004) (citing Great 
American, 322 NLRB 17, 21 (1996)); see also, e.g., Sprain 
Brook Manor Nursing Home, LLC, 351 NLRB 1190, 1191-92 
(2007) (applying “reasonable concern” rule).  As the NLRB 
explained in Nations Rent, “[s]o long as the employer is acting 
on the basis of a reasonable concern, Section 8(a)(1) is not 
violated merely because the police decide that, under all the 
circumstances, taking action against [the union representatives] 
is unwarranted.”  Id.  This rule thereby implicates both 
subjective and objective components.  The employer must 
possess a subjective concern about interference with legally 
protected interests, such as its private property rights.  The 
employer’s concern then must be objectively reasonable.  
ImageFirst manifestly satisfied both components.   
 According to the NLRB, the evidence in the record 
demonstrated that Cunningham called the police because he 
mistakenly believed that ImageFirst could eject the union 
representatives from the shoulder—and not because they were 
on the company’s driveway or other parts of its property.  The 
NLRB points out that the union representatives were on the 
shoulder when Cunningham threatened to summon the police, 
when he called the police, and when the police officers arrived.  
While conceding that the union representatives had initially 
entered ImageFirst’s property, the NLRB insists that they moved 
to the public right-of-way after their initial conversation with 
Cunningham and then stayed there.  “The union representatives 
testified that they remained in the public right-of-way after their 
initial conversation with Cunningham.  ([JA12, JA202-JA203, 
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JA220, JA225-JA228, JA234, JA331-JA332, JA336-JA337].)  
Officers Villano and Stutzman likewise testified that the 
representatives were on the shoulder when they arrived and 
remained there while they were on the scene.  ([JA7, JA8, 
JA391, JA429-JA430]).”  (NLRB’s Brief at 16-17.)  Officer 
Villano testified that he asked Cunningham where the union 
representatives were when they trespassed.  “And [Cunningham] 
said they were basically where they were at when I got there.  
That he had – in his conversation with the owner of the business, 
the owner of the business told him that the business owns that 
section of Prospect Road up to the double yellow lines there.  
And since the women were on that area of Prospect Road that 
[sic] they considered that trespassing.”  (JA393.)  Officer 
Villano explained to Cunningham that the shoulder was a public 
right-of–way, and Cunningham acquiesced in the union 
representatives remaining on the shoulder.  Admittedly, the ALJ 
did reject ImageFirst’s contention that Cunningham only wanted 
the union representatives removed from the property.  
“Although Cunningham told them to leave Respondent’s 
property, both Valentin and Grainer testified, without 
contradiction, that they were situated on the public right-of-way 
after their initial conversation with the police.”  (JA12.)  The 
ALJ also pointed out that “Officer Villano testified Cunningham 
never demanded they were on the property and refused to 
leave.”  (Id.)   
 Nevertheless, Cunningham was clearly concerned about 
more than the shoulder.  Cunningham testified that he witnessed 
these individuals continue to make forays onto the company’s 
driveway to leaflet vehicles—even after they had moved to the 
shoulder from the grassy area.  He observed these incursions 
onto ImageFirst’s private property when he first arrived at the 
facility (in fact, a union representative entered the driveway to 
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hand him a leaflet) and when he went to speak with them for the 
first time.  Asked about their second conversation, Cunningham 
testified that the driveway leafleting continued while he was 
“interacting” with the union representatives.  (JA484.)  “All the 
leafletings that I saw was going on right in this area [indicating 
ImageFirst’s driveway].”  (Id.)  According to the ALJ, “Valentin 
[who was in charge of the union representatives] admitted [on 
cross-examination] that she was but should not have been in the 
driveway.”  (JA4 (footnote omitted).)  “Valentin admitted that 
on occasions, a representative may have entered the driveway 
but no more than 5-10 feet from the shoulder area and would 
immediately leave the area.”  (Id.)  The union field coordinator 
also indicated that the union representatives were standing on 
the curb or the grassy area as much as ten percent of the time 
that they were present at ImageFirst’s facility (i.e., between 5% 
and 10% for Valentin herself, 0% and 5% for Gainer and 
Patterson, and “closer to 90% of the time on the shoulder” for 
Toledo (JA238)).   
As counsel for ImageFirst acknowledged at oral 
argument, the ALJ may not have enumerated the number of 
forays that occurred before the call to the police was made, after 
the call, and while the police were present on the scene.  The 
ALJ did undertake a full analysis to explain why “The 
Trespassing Was Insignificant to Warrant the Removal of the 
Union Representatives.”  (JA12.)  If the driveway forays had 
neither continued to occur nor furnished a motivation for calling 
the police, it would have been unnecessary for the ALJ to 
explain why such forays either did not constitute trespasses or, if 
they did, why such trespasses failed to constitute an adequate 
justification for calling the police.  Likewise, the ALJ never 
specifically found that Cunningham’s actions were motivated 
solely by a desire to remove the union representatives from the 
 
 21 
shoulder.  On the contrary, the ALJ refused “to credit 
Cunningham’s testimony that he merely wanted the four union 
representatives removed from the company’s property.”  (JA11 
(emphasis added).)  “In my opinion, I believe that the 
Respondent wanted the union representatives removed from the 
Respondent’s property that it mistakenly believed included the 
shoulder of Prospect Road.”  (Id.)  Yet ImageFirst’s property 
also “included” the curb, the grassy area, and the driveway 
itself. 
 Significantly, the ALJ found that a driveway foray 
occurred while the police were present and that this incursion 
was witnessed by one of the police officers.  According to the 
ALJ, “Officer Stutzman also recalled one leafletting occasion 
during his presence with a representative walking to the car.”  
(JA12.)  “The representatives would more likely than not had 
entered into Respondent’s driveway while under his 
observation.”  (JA12 (citing JA437, JA438).)  The NLRB asserts 
that “whatever happened could not have served as the basis for 
Cunningham’s call to police, as they were already on the scene.” 
 (NLRB’s Brief at 22 n.6.)  While technically correct, this 
subsequent incursion onto ImageFirst’s private property (which, 
after all, did take place despite the presence of two police 
officers) was consistent with the evidence and factual findings 
showing that such incursions continued to occur both before and 
after Cunningham’s call to the police.  The NLRB also 
dismisses the finding as “a statement by the administrative law 
judge” and observes that “Stutzman was not certain where the 
leafleting occurred ([JA437-JA438]), and he and Officer Villano 
concluded the representatives were not trespassing.”  (NLRB’s 
Brief at 22 n.6.)  The ALJ also noted that Officer Stutzman 
indicated on direct examination that the union representative 
was standing on the shoulder when the car was turning into the 
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driveway.  However, the ALJ appropriately relied on the 
“candid and open” testimony of a “neutral” observer that “was 
consistent with the corroborated record.”  (JA12 n.15.)  “On 
cross-examination by counsel for the Respondent, Officer 
Stutzman did not recall where the representative was standing 
when the driver was given a leaflet and did not recall which 
direction the car was coming from.  He only remembered a 
representative walking over to the car to hand out a leaflet.”  
(JA8 (citing JA437, JA438).)  The ALJ therefore made a finding 
of fact that the police officer observed a union representative 
entering ImageFirst’s driveway to leaflet.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 
160(c) (requiring NLRB to use “preponderance of the 
testimony” standard to decide whether person engaged in unfair 
labor practice).   
In its own decision, the NLRB did not reject this “foray” 
finding or any of the other findings of fact rendered by the ALJ. 
 On the contrary, the NLRB majority purportedly affirmed and 
adopted the ALJ’s findings.  The NLRB likewise cannot simply 
ignore relevant evidence.  See, e.g., Universal Camera, 340 U.S. 
at 488 (“The substantiality of evidence must take into account 
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.”); 
Lakeland Health Care Assocs., LLC v. NLRB, 696 F.3d 1332, 
1335 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that the NLRB cannot ignore 
relevant evidence detracting from its findings and that, when it 
fails to consider evidence, its conclusions are less likely to be 
based upon substantial evidence).  Yet the NLRB failed to 
address the evidence and factual findings establishing that the 
threat to call the police and the subsequent call itself were 
motivated by a broader concern about the company’s property 
interests.  Given this evidence and the findings of fact, 
ImageFirst was clearly motivated by more than a desire, as the 
majority put it, to “have the union representatives removed or 
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arrested because they were engaged in protected union 
handbilling on the public shoulder of the highway adjacent to 
the Respondent’s private property.”  (JA1 n.1.)  It was not 
enough for the NLRB to state that the union representative had 
already moved to the shoulder of the road and were standing on 
the shoulder when the police arrived.  At the very least, it should 
have addressed Cunningham’s testimony that he saw the union 
representatives continue to make forays onto ImageFirst’s 
driveway to leaflet vehicles, Valentin’s admission that she and 
the other representatives would occasionally enter the driveway 
to distribute leaflets, and the ALJ’s own factual finding of a 
driveway incursion witnessed by Officer Stutzman.  The NLRB 
majority stated that “[w]e do not rely on the judge’s finding that 
the union representatives’ entry onto the Respondent’s private 
property—by briefly standing on a grassy area and the 
Respondent’s driveway—as a de minimis trespass.”  (Id.)  But, 
under these circumstances, the ALJ’s “de minimis” trespass 
analysis should not be dismissed so easily. 
Because a reasonable fact-finder thereby would have had 
to find that ImageFirst’s threat to call the police and the 
subsequent call were motivated by a broader concern about its 
property interests, we must turn to the objective component of 
the “reasonable” concern inquiry.  We believe that no 
reasonable finder of fact could have failed to find that this 
concern was reasonable because, even though ImageFirst was 
wrong about the scope of its property rights over the shoulder, it 
still possessed the right to contact the police on account of the 
union representatives’ repeated and ongoing forays onto its 
private property.   
Initially, the NLRB has placed too much emphasis on 
what was happening at the exact moment that Cunningham 
 
 24 
threatened to summon or summoned the police or when the 
police arrived.  While certainly relevant, the notion of 
reasonableness requires consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 
251, 257 n.5 (1975) (indicating that reasonableness of discipline 
is determined by objective standards under all of the 
circumstances of the case).  “Notably, the Board cites no cases 
to support its view that the reasonableness of Cunningham’s 
property rights concern is a ‘spot’ determination, divorced from 
the Union’s trespassory conduct he had witnessed moments 
prior to the call.”  (ImageFirst’s Reply Brief at 4.)  Such an 
approach is particularly appropriate when the union 
representatives’ trespassory conduct continued to occur despite 
their interactions with Cunningham and the arrival of the police 
officers themselves.     
“ImageFirst is not disputing the NLRB’s limited finding 
that Cunningham’s erroneous belief that the Company had a 
property interest in the shoulder of the road was unreasonable, 
and thus, a violation of the Act.”  (ImageFirst’s Brief at 1 n.1.)  
But it is also undisputed that ImageFirst possessed property 
interests in the driveway as well as the grassy area and the curb, 
allowing it to exclude the union representatives and others.  
Counsel for the NLRB recognized at oral argument that both the 
majority and Chairman Miscimarra agreed that the ALJ made a 
mistake of law as to the propriety of “de minimis” trespasses.  
As we have explained, the company, even though it was wrong 
about the scope of its private property rights over the shoulder, 
was clearly motivated by a broader concern over its property 
interests implicated by the union representatives’ ongoing 
property incursions.  ImageFirst’s shoulder error (which has 
resulted in additional uncontested findings of unfair labor 
practices) should not be used to penalize it for contacting law 
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enforcement to vindicate its own property rights. 
In Nations Rent, the NLRB concluded that the employer 
summoned the police “based on a reasonable concern that the 
pickets were trespassing on its property, monitoring a police 
scanner, and following employees home.”  Nations Rent, 342 
NLRB at 181.  The majority ruling conceded that the employer 
unlawfully parked machinery outside its fence and erected 
scaffolding on a public easement: 
However, these facts do not establish that, in 
contacting the police, the Respondent was 
motivated by a purpose to harass rather than by its 
reasonable concerns.  There is no dispute that 
trespassory picketing occurred:  one of the pickets 
admitted trespassing on the Respondent’s 
property.  Our colleague says that the Respondent 
caused this trespass by moving a piece of 
equipment.  However, that does not negate the 
fact of trespass.  Further, there is no showing that 
in making way for the Respondent’s equipment, 
the picket’s sole option was to trespass.  He could 
have also driven away on Toledo Road and 
returned once the equipment had been moved.  
There is also no dispute that the trespass ended 
shortly after Olinger called the police, reasonably 
suggesting the possible use of a police scanner.  
The pickets also admitted following employees as 
they left the Elkhart facility.  In light of that fact, 
Olinger reasonably could be concerned that the 
pickets might be following employees home.  
This concern privileges the minimal intrusion of 
asking Officer Smith merely to “look into” or 
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“ask” the pickets whether they were doing so.  
Thus, for all of the foregoing reasons, we find that 
the Respondent’s involvement of the police on 
May 23 did not violate Section 8(a)(1). 
 In asserting a contrary view, our colleague 
relies on the Respondent’s unlawful effort to 
interfere with the pickets.  However, that conduct 
does not preclude the Respondent from calling 
police authorities to report a reasonable concern 
that local laws were being violated.  A contrary 
view would mean that a person who has violated 
the Act is precluded from calling local police to 
report local infractions.  Our colleague denies that 
this is his view.  However, that denial is premised 
on the asserted “spuriousness” of the 
Respondent’s concern about the picketing.  As set 
forth above, that concern was far from spurious. 
Id.; see also Great American, 322 NLRB at 20-21 (finding that, 
although employer cannot assert property interest to justify 
handbillers’ eviction from front of parking lot because it failed 
to show that they were trespassing on its private property, 
employer was justified in summoning police to evict because 
handbillers were causing traffic to be blocked from entering 
parking lot and to be backed up into street).  In this proceeding, 
ImageFirst’s mistake over its right to exclude from the shoulder 
“does not negate the fact of trespass” on its private property.  
Even though ImageFirst was wrong about the shoulder, “that 
conduct does not preclude the Respondent from calling police 
authorities to report a reasonable concern that local laws were 
being violated” because the union representatives were making 
repeated and ongoing forays onto its own property.  Nations 
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Rent, 342 NLRB at 181.   
IV. 
We will grant in part and deny in part the NLRB’s 
application for enforcement as well as ImageFirst’s cross-
petition for review.  We will grant the application for 
enforcement and deny the cross-petition for review as to the 
NLRB’s findings that ImageFirst violated Section 8(a)(1) of the 
NLRA by prohibiting union representatives from distributing 
pro-union literature in the public right-of-way adjacent to 
ImageFirst’s facility and by trying to remove the union 
representatives from the public right-of-way.  We will grant the 
cross-petition for review and will deny the application for 
enforcement as to the finding by the NLRB that ImageFirst 
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by threatening to summon 
and summoning the police when the union representatives 
refused to leave from the public right-of-way. 
 
